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The McNulty Memo—Continuing the
Disappointment
Keith Paul Bishop*
In late December 2006, Deputy Attorney General Paul
McNulty announced the publication of a revised set of guidelines
for federal criminal prosecutions of business organizations.1 In
issuing these guidelines, the Deputy Attorney General was not
breaking new ground. Rather, he was simply adjusting the previously announced policies of his predecessors. Yet, these new
guidelines, set forth in what is known as the “McNulty Memorandum,” have been widely criticized. To understand why, it is
necessary to put the McNulty Memorandum in historical context
with its antecedents. It is only by understanding Department of
Justice policy for the last seven years that one can know why the
publication of the McNulty Memorandum has been viewed with
such disappointment.
The story of the McNulty Memorandum begins in June 1999
when Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memorandum addressed to all Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys.2
The ostensible purpose for the memorandum was to provide
guidance to prosecutors in making the decision whether to charge
a corporation in a particular case. According to the memorandum, guidance was necessary because “[m]ore and more often,
federal prosecutors are faced with criminal conduct committed by
or on behalf of corporations.”3 On its face the memorandum was
thus nothing more than bureaucratic guidance. As such, it could
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law; shareholder in the
law firm of Buchalter Nemer. Professor Bishop has previously served as California’s
Commissioner of Corporations; Deputy Secretary and General Counsel of the California
Business, Transportation & Housing Agency; and Interim Savings & Loan Commissioner.
1 Memorandum from Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney General to Heads of Dep’t
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum].
2 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General to All Component Heads and U.S.
Attorneys (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/
policy/Chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder Memorandum]. In the parlance of the U.S.
Justice Department, a “Component head means the official who directs the administration and operations of each Office, Board, Division, and Bureau, i.e., the principal organizational units of the Department of Justice.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Human Resources
Dictionary (Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ps/appendix1.htm.
3 Holder Memorandum, supra note 2.
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have been expected to attract little attention outside the walls of
the Justice Department. The memorandum, which soon earned
the eponym the “Holder Memorandum,” proved to be the father
of a series of highly controversial memoranda issued by Mr.
Holder’s successors.
What has made the Holder Memorandum and its progeny so
controversial? The core of the Holder Memorandum was its
enumeration of factors that federal prosecutors should consider
in determining whether to bring criminal charges against a corporation.4 In this regard, the idea of charging corporations, while
unknown at common law,5 was not a new idea. Indeed, over
ninety years ago the U.S. Supreme Court had found “no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy” to hold corporations criminally liable.6 Moreover, the Supreme Court found that
the government’s ability to regulate business transactions would
be vitiated if corporations could not be criminally regulated because of “the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot
commit a crime.”7 Given that the notion of criminal prosecutions
of corporations was well settled by 1999, it might have been expected that the idea of providing guidance to federal prosecutors
in making the decision to charge corporations was both appropriate and reasonable. As it turned out, it was not the idea of prosecuting corporations or even the idea of providing guidance on the
decision to prosecute that was controversial; it was the content of
the guidance itself.
The Holder Memorandum enumerated eight factors that
prosecutors should consider in deciding whether to charge a corporation.8 One of these factors—the corporation’s willingness to
Id. at II.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *464 (“A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in [its] corporate capacity: though [its] members may, in
their distinct individual capacities.” (citation omitted)).
6 N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
7 Id. at 496.
8 The eight factors were:
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to
the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations for particular categories of crime;
4
5

2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate management;
3. The corporation’s history of similar conduct, including prior criminal,
civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it;
4. The corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product privileges;
5. The existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program;
6. The corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to implement
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cooperate—became the principal lightning rod for criticism of the
Holder Memorandum and its progeny.9 The concept of cooperation was not so controversial in and of itself. Rather, it was the
Holder Memorandum’s express reference to the corporation’s
waiver of the attorney-client and work product protections as an
element of cooperation that proved to be the problem.10 The
Holder Memorandum made it clear that a waiver of the attorneyclient protections extended to internal investigations as well as
specific communications with counsel by individuals within the
corporation.11
Deputy Attorney General Holder advanced two justifications
for including a waiver of attorney-client protections as an element of cooperation.12 Neither justification is assailable if only
the interests of the prosecutor are considered. However, both fail
to take into account countervailing interests. Thus, the Holder
Memorandum was in this respect unbalanced.
First, Deputy Attorney General Holder noted that “[s]uch
waivers permit the government to obtain statements of possible
witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements.”13 From a prosean effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay
restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies;
7. Collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to shareholders and employees not proven personally culpable; and
8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.
Holder Memorandum, supra note 2, at II (citations omitted).
9 See, e.g., American College of Trial Lawyers, Report, The Erosion of the AttorneyClient Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L.
REV. 307 (2003); Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal
Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111 (2003).
10 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not enumerate specific evidentiary privileges.
Under Rule 501, privileges are “governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience” except as otherwise provided by the Constitution, federal statute, or rules adopted
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. FED. R. EVID. 501. The attorneyclient privilege protects from disclosure communications by a client that are made in confidence for the purpose of seeking legal advice from a legal advisor. United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2002). The work product doctrine is separate and distinct
from the attorney-client privilege. The work product doctrine protects documents and
materials prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 509–10 (1947). In this article, the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are referred to collectively as the “attorney-client protections.”
11 Holder Memorandum, supra note 2, at VI.
12 Id.
13 Id. The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual defines a “target” as “a person as to whom the
prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant.” U.S.
Attorneys’ Manual § 9-11.151, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/
title9/11mcrm.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007). A “subject” of an investigation is defined
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cutor’s perspective, using corporations to interrogate individuals
makes good sense. Individuals, unlike corporations, have the
benefit of the constitutional right against self-incrimination.14
Moreover, it is likely that individuals will become aware of their
Fifth Amendment right. The fact that law enforcement is asking
questions may in many cases be sufficient to cause an individual
to call his or her lawyer. If the individual is subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury as a target, it is the Justice Department’s
policy to send a “target letter” warning the individual that he
“may refuse to answer any question if a truthful answer to the
question would tend to incriminate you.”15 Even if not advised by
counsel, the fact that questioning is being performed by law enforcement is likely to alert an individual to the potential ramifications of the interrogation. Once apprised of their Fifth
Amendment right, individuals are unlikely to waive that right
without at least attempting to get something in exchange.
On the other hand, individuals may view internal corporate
investigations as having less serious consequences than investigations conducted by federal prosecutors.16 Given the private nature of the inquiry, they may fail to consult with legal counsel
and may believe that the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination is inapplicable. Moreover, employees may believe,
with some real justification, that failure to cooperate in their employer’s internal review will lead to the loss of their jobs. For example, Smithfield Foods, Inc., has adopted a corporate code of
business conduct that provides in part:
Full cooperation with internal investigations is a condition of each
employee’s employment with Smithfield. Any effort by an employee to
hinder an investigation with false or misleading information, or by refusing to provide information that he or she has, will be addressed
with disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment.17
as “a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury’s investigation.” Id. A
witness is simply someone who may have relevant information. Generally, a target faces
a higher risk of prosecution than a subject or witness, but a subject or witness may become a target and eventually a criminal defendant.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself . . . .”). See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90
(1974) (“[N]o artificial organization may utilize the personal privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination . . . .”); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944) (“Since the
privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one, it cannot be utilized by or on
behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.”).
15 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 13, § 9-11.151.
16 “Employees often are unaware of the potential personal consequences of cooperating with lawyers hired by their employers.” United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459,
462 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
17 Smithfield Foods, Corporate Governance: Business Conduct, at Part V,
http://www.smithfieldfoods.com/Governance/BusinessConduct/PartV_Training.asp
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2007).
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For all of these reasons, persons conducting internal corporate investigations can expect to face fewer obstacles than federal
prosecutors when questioning employees. Recognizing this reality, the Holder Memorandum dangles the carrot of leniency before corporations in order to encourage them to do the questioning for the prosecution. Prosecutors can then use the information
gathered in these “internal” investigations to charge individuals
with crimes.18 The Holder Memorandum’s justification for seeking waivers therefore simply articulates a pragmatic approach to
making an end-run around the Fifth Amendment.19
Second, Deputy Attorney General Holder justified seeking
waivers of the attorney-client protections on the basis that waivers are “often critical in enabling the government to evaluate the
completeness of a corporation’s voluntary disclosure and cooperation.”20 From the perspective of a prosecutor, this justification is
also plausible. However, it ignores other countervailing policies
and values that have long justified the application of the attorney-client protections.
It should be remembered that the Holder Memorandum predates the headline-grabbing collapses of Adelphia, Enron, and
WorldCom.21 It also predates the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Presi18 That federal prosecutors use the information gathered by counsel in the course of
internal investigations in charging individual defendants is indisputable. In 2006, for example, the government filed a criminal complaint against George Reyes, the former Chief
Executive Officer of Brocade Communications, and Stephenie Jensen, its Vice President
of Human Resources, for securities fraud in connection with alleged backdating of stock
options. The U.S. Attorney’s criminal complaint cited interviews of the defendants conducted by Brocade’s audit committee. The complaint includes such allegations as “[w]hen
interviewed by the attorneys representing Brocade’s Audit Committee at the end of 2004,
JENSEN stated . . . .” and “[w]hen interviewed by the attorneys representing Brocade’s
Audit Committee in early 2005, REYES admitted . . . .” Affidavit in Support of Complaint
by FBI Special Agent Joseph Schadler, United States v. Reyes, 239 F.R.D. 591 (N.D. Cal.
2006),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press/2006/
ReyesJensencCRIMINALComplaint.PDF. In response to a survey of federal prosecutors
concerning requests or demands for waiver of privileges from organizational defendants,
the U.S. Attorney’s office for the Southern District of New York stated that “the purpose
in seeking such waivers is to obtain evidence, which we believe may assist us in prosecuting appropriate individuals or entities.” REPORT OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP ON THE
ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 99 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
corp/advgrprpt/AG_Final.pdf [hereinafter AD HOC REPORT].
19 This approach is constitutionally suspect.
This Court finds that the government, both through the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO [U.S. Attorney’s Office], quite deliberately
coerced, and in any case significantly encouraged, KPMG to pressure its employees to surrender their Fifth Amendment rights. There is a clear nexus between the government ‘and the specific conduct of which’ the Moving Defendants complain.
Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 337 (quoting Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191
F.3d 198, 207 (1999)).
20 Holder Memorandum, supra note 2, at VI.
21 Adelphia Communications, Enron Corp., and WorldCom, Inc. filed voluntary peti-
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dent Bush’s establishment in 2002 of a Corporate Fraud Task
Force.22 Thus, the Holder Memorandum constituted the principal guidance for U.S. Attorneys during a period of heightened
public awareness of criminal prosecutions of corporations and
their executives.23
In January 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson updated the Holder Memorandum by issuing what soon became known as the “Thompson Memorandum.”24 Although the
Thompson Memorandum largely copied the Holder Memorandum, the Thompson Memorandum did contain at least one key
difference (at least in the minds of its interpreters): The Thompson Memorandum was viewed as binding upon prosecutors,
whereas the Holder Memorandum was viewed as simply advisory.25 For example, the Thompson Memorandum added the injunction that “prosecutors and investigators in every matter involving business crimes must assess the merits of seeking the
conviction of the business entity itself.”26 In contrast, the Holder
Memorandum spoke of providing “guidance as to what factors
should generally inform a prosecutor.”27 Despite the Thompson
Memorandum’s apparent binding nature, it retained the Holder
Memorandum’s statement that waiver of the attorney-client protections is not an “absolute requirement” of cooperation.28
The Thompson Memorandum’s continuing inclusion of
waiver of the attorney-client protections as an element of cooptions seeking relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In re Adelphia Business
Solutions, Inc., 280 B.R. 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034
(AJG), 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1563 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Worldcom, Inc., No. 0213533 (AJG), at 2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/opinions/
ajg/54767_18686_opinion.pdf.
22 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2003).
23 In fact, prosecutorial efforts largely focused on individuals, with a few notable exceptions, such as the criminal conviction of Arthur Andersen LLP, which had been Enron
Corporation’s public auditor. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned that conviction. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005).
24 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
cftf/business_organizations.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum].
25 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (2006) (“Unlike its predecessor
[the Holder Memorandum], however, the Thompson Memorandum is binding on all federal prosecutors.”); Carmen Couden, Note, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solution or Just a Problem?, 30 J. CORP. L. 405, 416 (2005) (“[I]t is more appropriate for corporations to consider the provisions set forth in the Thompson Memorandum as government
‘rules’ rather than discretionary ‘guidelines’ and prepare for an investigation accordingly.”).
26 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 24, para. 1 (emphasis added).
27 Holder Memorandum, supra note 2.
28 Id. While this statement makes it clear that a waiver is not always required, the
phraseology of the memorandum suggests that a decision to not to seek a waiver was to be
the exception rather than the rule.

729-744 BISHOP.DOC

2007]

9/18/2007 7:02:59 AM

The McNulty Memo—Continuing the Disappointment

735

eration was consistent with policies adopted by other federal
agencies in the wake of the Holder Memorandum. For example,
in October 2001, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
issued a Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement (the “21(a) Report”).29 The report announced the settlement of a cease-anddesist proceeding against the former corporate controller of a
subsidiary of Seaboard Corporation.30 The SEC, however, took
no action against Seaboard itself. The SEC cited Seaboard’s cooperation, including Seaboard’s decision not to invoke the attorney-client privilege, as the basis for not pursuing the corporation.31
Nonetheless, the private bar’s reaction to the Thompson
Memorandum was decidedly negative. In November 2003, the
Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section of the California State Bar issued a public commentary decrying the pressure on clients to waive the attorney-client and work product proThe public commentary cited the Thompson
tections.32
Memorandum as one example of this type of pressure. The following year, American Bar Association President Robert Gray,
Jr. established a Presidential Task Force to advocate for the attorney-client privilege (the “Task Force”).33 The Task Force’s
work resulted in the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates’ adopting resolutions in August 2005 opposing the routine
practice by government officials of requesting waivers of the attorney-client and work product protections:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association strongly supports the preservation of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine as essential to maintaining the confidential relationship
between client and attorney required to encourage clients to discuss
their legal matters fully and candidly with their counsel so as to (1)
promote compliance with law through effective counseling, (2) ensure
effective advocacy for the client, (3) ensure access to justice and (4)
promote the proper and efficient functioning of the American adversary system of justice; and

29 Report of Investigation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44969, 76 SEC Docket 220
(Oct. 23, 2001).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 220–21.
32 CORPORATIONS COMM. BUS. LAW SECTION, THE STATE BAR OF CAL., AT EVERY
PERIL: NEW PRESSURES ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 1 (2003), available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/buslaw/corporations/2003-11-18_publiccommentary.pdf.
33 AM. BAR ASSOC., TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3 (2006), available at http://www.acca.com/public/attyclientpriv/
abahodreportemployee.pdf.
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FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association
opposes policies, practices and procedures of governmental bodies
that have the effect of eroding the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine and favors policies, practices and procedures that
recognize the value of those protections.
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association
opposes the routine practice by government officials of seeking to obtain a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine
through the granting or denial of any benefit or advantage.34

In apparent reaction to this criticism, Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert McCallum issued a memorandum in October
2005 (the “McCallum Memorandum”).35 The McCallum Memorandum did not revise the Thompson Memorandum. Rather the
McCallum Memorandum imposed two new limitations on prosecutors seeking waivers of the attorney-client protections. First,
the McCallum Memorandum established supervisory review as a
pre-condition to any request for a waiver.36 Second, each U.S. Attorney’s Office was directed to institute a written waiver review
policy governing such requests.37 The McCallum Memorandum
did not require that these policies be made publicly available.
Further, the McCallum Memorandum specifically disclaimed any
requirement of consistency among the various U.S. Attorney’s Offices around the country.38 Thus, corporations continued to be in
a position in which they could only guess as to prosecutorial expectations.39 From the perspective of the bar, moreover, the
McCallum Memorandum did little to reduce pressure to waive
the attorney-client protections.
In late 2006, both the Senate and the House of Representatives held hearings on the attorney-client privilege and the
Thompson Memorandum.40 In connection with this hearing, a
coalition of business and bar associations submitted a report of a
survey of in-house and outside counsel.41 The report unequivoId.
Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General, to
Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 21, 2005), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.
pdf.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 See The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 130 (2006) (statement of Edwin Meese III, Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow in Pub. Policy and Chairman, Ctr. for Legal and Judicial Studies, The Heritage Found.).
40 Id.; White Collar Enforcement: Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Waivers:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006).
41 THE COAL. TO PRES. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, SUBMISSION TO THE U.S.
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REGARDING HEARINGS ON COERCED WAIVER OF THE
34
35
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cally cites the Holder, Thompson, and McCallum Memoranda as
the reasons for waiver demands. The coalition also reported that
nearly 75% of the respondents agreed with the statement that a
“culture of waiver” has evolved.42
Three months later, on December 8, 2006, Senator Arlen
Specter introduced the “Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act
of 2006” which, among other things, would prohibit federal prosecutors from conditioning a civil or criminal charging decision on
an assertion of the attorney-client and work product protections.43 Perhaps like King Belshazzar, seeing the handwriting on
the wall, the Department of Justice replaced the Thompson
Memorandum less than a week after the introduction of Senator
Specter’s bill.44 This new memorandum was penned by Deputy
Attorney General Paul McNulty and, like its predecessors, it
shares the name of its author.45
If the intent of the McNulty Memorandum was to quiet criticism of Department of Justice policies regarding waiver of the attorney-client protections, the memorandum has been a failure.
The private bar has been highly critical of the McNulty Memorandum. For example, American Bar Association President
Karen Mathis stated that “[t]he Justice Department’s new corporate charging guidelines for federal prosecutors fall far short of
what is needed to prevent further erosion of fundamental attorney-client privilege, work product, and employee protections during government investigations.”46
Disappointment with the McNulty Memorandum in part
stems from the decisive and less nuanced action taken last year
by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.47 A little over a year after
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: THE NEGATIVE IMPACT FOR CLIENTS, CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (Sept. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.acca.com/public/attyclientpriv/coalitionsenjudtestimony.pdf
[hereinafter
COALITION SUBMISSION]. The coalition consists of the American Chemistry Council, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Association of Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., the Business Roundtable, the Financial Services Roundtable, the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Association of Manufacturers, and
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Id. at 1.
42 Id. at 11–12.
43 S. 30, 109th Cong. (2006).
44 Daniel 5:5–6 (King James) (“In the same hour came forth fingers of a man’s hand,
and wrote over against the candlestick upon the plaister of the wall of the king’s palace:
and the king saw the part of the hand that wrote. Then the king’s countenance was
changed, and his thoughts troubled him . . . .”).
45 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 1.
46 Press Release, Karen J. Mathis, President, Am. Bar Assoc., Statement Regarding
Revisions to the Justice Department’s Thompson Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/statement.cfm?releaseid=59.
47 Congress created the Sentencing Commission as part of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, § 217(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2000). The duties of the Sentencing Commission include promulgating and distributing guidelines for use of a sentencing court in
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the publication of the Thompson Memorandum, the Sentencing
Commission had amended its sentencing guidelines to include
the following commentary in relation to corporate cooperation:
“[w]aiver of attorney-client privilege and of work product protections is not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability
score . . . unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide
timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information
known to the organization.”48 In making this change, the Sentencing Commission was influenced by the Thompson Memorandum and the practices of the Department of Justice.49 Despite
the fact that the Sentencing Commission pronounced its expectation that “waivers will be required on a limited basis,”50 many
viewed the change as placing greater pressures on corporations
to provide waivers to prosecutors. As a result, an informal coalition was formed to address the issue.51 In May 2005, the American Bar Association wrote to the Sentencing Commission urging
that it “address and remedy the Commentary on an expedited
basis.”52 A year later, the Sentencing Commission removed the
offending footnote.53
If the intent of the McNulty Memorandum was to forestall
further legislative efforts to limit prosecutorial decisions based
upon assertion or waiver of the attorney-client protections, the
memorandum has also failed in that regard. In January 2007,
Senator Specter introduced a new bill, S. 186, the AttorneyClient Privilege Protection Act of 2007.54 In general, this bill
would prohibit an agent or attorney of the United States in any
federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement matter
from, among other things, “demand[ing], request[ing], or condition[ing] treatment on the disclosure by an organization, or person affiliated with that organization, of any communication prodetermining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case. § 994(a).
48 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 69 Fed. Reg. 28,994, 29,021 (May
19, 2004).
49 See id. at 29024.
50 See id. at 29021.
51 AM. BAR ASSOC. TASK FORCE ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT (2005),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/report.pdf.
In
addition to the ABA Task Force, the coalition consisted of the American Chemistry Council, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Association of Corporate Counsel, Business
Civil Liberties, Inc., the Business Roundtable, Frontiers of Freedom, the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Washington Legal
Foundation. Id. at 16 n.75.
52 Letter from Robert D. Evans to The Honorable Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chairman,
U.S. Sentencing Comm. (May 17, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/
letters/crimlaw/050517letter_sentencing.pdf.
53 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 71 Fed. Reg. 28062, 28073 (May
15, 2006).
54 Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007),
available at http://www.acc.com/public/attyclientpriv/thompsonmemoleg.pdf.
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tected by the attorney-client privilege or any attorney work product.”55 This bill would also prohibit “condition[ing] a civil or
criminal charging decision relating to an organization, or person
affiliated with that organization, on . . . any valid assertion of the
attorney-client [protections].”56
The McNulty Memorandum borrows heavily from its antecedents. Yet, it does break some new ground. Rather than stating
that a waiver is not an “absolute” requirement, the McNulty
Memorandum limits requests for waiver of the attorney-client
protections to only those circumstances in which “there is a leMoreover, the
gitimate need” for privileged information.57
McNulty Memorandum makes it clear that a “legitimate need” is
not established by the fact that it may be “desirable or convenient” for prosecutors to obtain the information.58 According to the
McNulty Memorandum, whether a “legitimate need” exists depends upon:
(1) the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will
benefit the government’s investigation;
(2) whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely and
complete fashion by using alternative means that do not require
waiver;
(3) the completeness of the voluntary disclosure already provided; and
(4) the collateral consequences to a corporation of a waiver.59

While these criteria appear to be far more specific than the
Holder and Thompson Memoranda, the reality may be far different. As an initial matter, the requirement that there be a “legitimate need” sets the bar at the lowest possible level. The first
criterion is really no criterion at all—the government should not
be seeking information unless the information would benefit its
investigation. To forbid prosecutors from seeking information
that does not benefit their investigations proscribes very little
indeed. The second criterion is equally hollow. If the prosecutor
can timely and completely obtain the information elsewhere,
there is little gained (and little given) by a waiver of the privilege. Presumably, prosecutors seek waivers because they cannot
obtain the information easily by other means. This was, in fact,
one of the principal justifications for seeking waivers in the
Holder Memorandum.60 The third criterion underscores the continuing self-interested pragmatism of the Department of Justice’s
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. § 3(b)(1).
Id. § 3(b)(2).
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 1, at 8.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Holder Memorandum, supra note 2, at VI.
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approach to waivers. In effect, the Department is saying that our
need for information legitimizes our need for waivers. The final
criterion is also problematic. From a societal standpoint, the
benefits of the attorney-client protections are undermined whenever they are waived. One of the principal reasons for protecting
communications between a client and the attorney is to encourage full and candid communications.61 If employees know that
the government will pressure their employers to turn over the results of communications with corporate counsel, they are more
likely to limit their disclosures to counsel.62 Ultimately, corporations will be less able to self-police, remediate and prevent legal
violations.
The McNulty Memorandum also divides attorney-client protected information into two categories. Prosecutors are authorized to seek so-called “Category I” material with the “written authorization from the United States Attorney who must provide a
copy of the request to, and consult with, the Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division.”63 The request must specify
the “legitimate need” for the information and identify the scope of
the waiver sought. The McNulty Memorandum does not explain
the extent of consultation required or whether the U.S. Attorney’s decision to seek a waiver can be overruled by the Assistant
Attorney General. For example, will it be sufficient for a prosecutor to establish a legitimate need by simply reciting why the
information will help the investigation, or must the prosecutor
provide a balanced analysis of the criteria identified in the
McNulty Memorandum? In introducing S. 186, Senator Specter
noted these points and observed that “it is difficult to see how the
McNulty memo provides better safeguards for Category 1 information than the interim-McCallum memo . . . which mandated a
U.S. Attorney-level ‘written waiver review process’ for all attorney client privilege waiver requests.”64
Category I information is characterized as “purely factual information” that may or may not be privileged relating to the underlying misconduct.65 Under the McNulty Memorandum, examples of Category I information include but are not limited to: (i)
key documents; (ii) witness statements; (iii) purely factual interview memoranda regarding the underlying misconduct; (iv) orUnited States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 810 (7th Cir. 2003).
AD HOC REPORT, supra note 18, at 102 (“The possibility that the government may
require a waiver, and the fear of both the criminal and civil consequences of such a
waiver, create strong disincentives for organizations to conduct thorough internal investigations, as well as for employees to cooperate in such investigations.” (citations omitted)).
63 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 1, at 9.
64 153 CONG. REC. S182 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2007) (statement of Sen. Specter).
65 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 1, at 9.
61
62
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ganizational charts created by company counsel; (v) factual chronologies; (vi) factual summaries; or (vii) reports containing investigative facts reported to counsel.66 Of course, the line between
fact and opinion can often be indistinct at best. For example, a
report purporting to contain investigative facts reported to counsel may implicitly reflect an attorney’s interpretation or opinions
about the facts reported.
The McNulty Memorandum clearly authorizes prosecutors to
consider a corporation’s response to a waiver of Category I information in determining whether the corporation has cooperated in
the government’s investigation.67 Thus, the McNulty Memorandum leaves intact the carrot (and implicit stick) of cooperation
that had its genesis in the Holder Memorandum.
If the Category I information provides an incomplete basis to
conduct a thorough investigation, the McNulty Memorandum authorizes prosecutors to request a waiver of so-called Category II
information.68 The McNulty Memorandum cautions that waivers
“should only be sought in rare circumstances.”69 Category II “information includes legal advice given to the corporation before,
during, and after the underlying misconduct occurred.”70 Thus,
Category II information can include attorney-client protected information developed in the course of an internal investigation as
well as legal advice given after conclusion of the investigation.
The McNulty Memorandum cites as examples of Category II information the following:
(i) Attorney notes, memoranda containing mental impressions and
conclusions;
(ii) legal determinations as a result of an internal investigation; or
(iii) legal advice given to the corporation.71

Category II information does not include “legal advice contemporaneous to the underlying misconduct when the corporation or one of its employees is relying upon an advice-of-counsel
defense.”72 Nor does it include “legal advice or communications
in furtherance of a crime or fraud, coming within the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege.”73 In either case, the
McNulty Memorandum allows prosecutors to follow the procedures for seeking waivers that are applicable to Category I in66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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formation.
Before requesting Category II information, a prosecutor
must request authorization from the Deputy Attorney General.74
Again, any request must set forth the legitimate need and the
scope of the waiver sought. “If the request is authorized, the
[U.S.] Attorney must communicate the request in writing to the
corporation.”75
If the corporation declines to provide Category II information, prosecutors may not consider a negative response to a request for Category II information in deciding whether to prosecute the corporation.76
However, prosecutors “may always
favorably consider a corporation’s acquiescence to the government’s waiver request in determining whether a corporation has
cooperated in the government’s investigation.”77 Seemingly,
therefore, the McNulty Memorandum has removed the “stick” for
refusals to provide Category II information while maintaining
the “carrot.” In practice, however, corporations may simply not
see it this way. A benefit denied is likely to be perceived in much
the same way as a punishment.
The McNulty Memorandum’s bifurcation of information was
likely founded upon distinctions made by some courts with respect to attorney work product.78 Under this analysis, the “presumption in favor of nondisclosure is shifted with respect to fact
work product.”79 Opinion work-product, on the other hand, is afforded a higher (in some cases, absolute) level of protection.80
Even though these distinctions have been made for purposes of
the work product doctrine, they have no application to the attorney-client privilege. Yet, the McNulty Memorandum inexplicably
conflates these two protections without providing any rationale
for doing so.
The McNulty Memorandum appears to strengthen the attorney-client privilege by requiring written authorization before
seeking waivers of either Category I or Category II information.
In practice, however, prosecutors can easily sidestep these procedures. For example, a prosecutor might still mention the benefits
of waiving the privilege while not directly requesting a waiver.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986) (“Some
courts interpreting [Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947),] have defined two types of
work product.”).
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973).
74
75
76
77
78
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Indeed, there have been anecdotal reports of such “subtle” requests even before the McNulty Memorandum was issued.81
In conclusion, the McNulty Memorandum has disappointed
many because it is consistent with its history. Throughout the
saga of the Holder/Thompson/McCallum memoranda, the Department of Justice has steadfastly retained the ability to seek,
and credit as cooperation, waivers of attorney-client protections.
The McNulty Memorandum does not break with this tradition. It
sets a very low bar for requests for waivers, and while it purports
to impose additional procedural protections, prosecutors can easily circumvent these protections.

81 COALITION SUBMISSION, supra note 41, at 10 (“Other prosecutors cited in our surveys employ other ‘subtle’ tactics such as tossing a copy of the Thompson Memo on the
table with the privilege waiver section highlighted and making a statement such as ‘you’d
like to qualify for the benefits of cooperation in this investigation, correct?’”).

729-744 BISHOP.DOC

744

9/18/2007 7:02:59 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:729

